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This research paper investigates whether South Africa should opt for private enforcement as 
opposed to public enforcement to entrench good corporate governance. In so doing, the paper 
goes on to develop a framework for determining the suitability of an enforcement strategy. 
 
It is submitted that to derive at a sound enforcement strategy a three-pronged analysis is required. 
This analysis can be captured as follows:  
  
1. Determining whether a country has good laws, principles and rules as it relates to 
corporate governance;  
2. Evaluating the suitability of the enforcement framework of the country; and 
3. Identifying prevailing corporate governance challenge(s). 
 
The application of this analysis to the South African context reveals that South Africa has good 
laws, principles and rules as it relates to corporate governance. It also reveals that the 
enforcement framework is capable of assuring investors that their investments will be protected 
and hence suitable. As far as corporate governance challenges are concerned, it is reasoned that 
South Africa, as a leading emerging country, experiences corporate governance problems 
common to both developed and developing countries. South Africa would therefore be better 
equipped, if it had a balanced enforcement framework; recognising no priori winner between the 
two categories of enforcement. This is aligned with the latest empirical evidence, which holds 
that the ‘multiple mechanisms’ approach is evident in developed countries with strong financial 
markets. 
 
Furthermore, it is also submitted that the establishment of good corporate governance is too 
important for emerging and developing countries to gamble with favouring one enforcement 
category over the other.    
 
The adoption of this hypothesis, rules out the World Bank’s provocative recommendation that 











PART A  
 
‘Enforcement more than regulations, laws-on-the-books or voluntary codes is key to effective corporate governance, 
at least in transition and developing countries. Corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms are intimately 
linked as they affect firms’ ability to commit towards their stakeholders, in particular towards external investors.’1
 
 
Erik Berglöf and Stijn Claessens 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Background: Corporate Law Reform 
For the past six and half years a great deal of attention has been devoted to the reform of South 
African company law. The reform process commenced in September 2003, when the Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI) initiated a reform programme that included a review of existing 
securities regulation and, of corporate structures and practices in the area of corporate 
governance. Subsequently, in March 2004 (and updated in June 2004) the DTI published a policy 
document on corporate law reform entitled ‘South African Company Law for the 21st Century: 
Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform’. This policy paper explained that company law in South 
Africa would be reviewed and modernised. The objectives of the reform process were to align it 
with international trends and to accommodate the economic and legislative changes that have 
taken place in South Africa since the advent of democracy in 1994. The policy paper also 
explained that this reform process would occur in two stages. Firstly, urgent interim changes 
would be brought by the Corporate Law Amendment Act No 24 of 2006. The Act provided for, 
amongst others, assistance to acquire shares and greater protection of minority shareholders in 
respect of takeovers .The Act came into effect on 14 December 2007. Secondly, the new 
Companies Act will repeal and replace the entire Companies Act No 61 of 1973, when it 
becomes operational. 
The promulgation of the new Companies Act No 71 of 2008 signalled the completion of a 
comprehensive overhaul of company law in South Africa. This Act is less bulky and complicated 
than its predecessor and it incorporates certain common law principles relating to companies, 
                                                   











directors and shareholders. Moreover, it was modelled on similar legislation in operation in New 
Zealand, Australia, Canada and United States (Maryland). Despite this ‘comprehensive’ exercise 
in reforming South African company law, particularly in respect of ‘laws on books’, the 
importance of enforcement should not be underestimated. Enforcement is regarded as being 
pivotal for the overall effectiveness of corporate governance. It is against this backdrop that this 
thesis focuses on enforcement strategies in relation to good corporate governance. 
 
1.2. Research question 
 
The research question to be addressed by this study is whether South Africa should favour 
private enforcement as opposed to public enforcement to entrench good corporate governance.  
 
1.3 Scope of the study  
 
The departure point of this research paper is that ‘statutory regulations, laws-on-books or 
voluntary codes’ are not by themselves adequate to address the issue of good corporate 
governance.2
 
 There is a need for enforcement to be looked at critically.  
The research paper seeks to critically analyse whether South Africa should favour private 
enforcement as opposed to public enforcement to entrench good corporate governance. This 
analysis involves a two-pronged approach. Firstly, it aims to ascertain whether South Africa has 
in place the enforcement framework that assures public investors that their assets will be 
protected. This discussion will focus on the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 and King III, 
specifically highlighting the corporate governance developments. The second part of the research 
paper will proceed to consider whether South Africa should favour private enforcement as 
opposed to public enforcement. In executing this objective, empirical work undertaken in 
securities law will be relied upon. 
 
It is important to note that the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 (hereafter referred to as the new 
Companies Act) was promulgated in April 2009 and is not yet in operation. Stakeholders 
                                                   











anticipate a commencement dated of 1 July 2010; however, this date seems unlikely after an 
editorial process was initiated to address mistakes that occurred during the processing of the Bill. 
Similarly, King III was finalised on 1 September 2009 and comes into operation on 1 March 
2010. Despite their current status, this research paper will use both the new Companies Act and 
King III as its main source documents.     
1.4 Structure of the paper 
To address the research question, the paper commences with a brief background of the company 
law reform process that has unfolded in South Africa in part A. This is followed with an 
overview of corporate governance. This discussion focuses on two main issues, namely: ‘what is 
corporate governance and why corporate governance’. This overview also includes an evaluation 
of the enforcement framework in South Africa as it relates to corporate governance.  This 
discussion will include a high-level comparison between South Africa and United Kingdom in 
respect of the dominant enforcement tools available in both countries. United Kingdom has been 
selected for comparison primarily because of the available empirical evidence and since it is also 
a common law country. This comparison, however, is not without its shortcomings. It is 
recognised that the corporate governance challenges differ between developed and developing 
countries. Notwithstanding this, it will still be useful to be aware of the dominant enforcement 
tools available in a highly developed stock market such as the United Kingdom. The 
developments in United Kingdom could serve as lessons for South Africa. This section, part B, 
concludes by highlighting the relationship between corporate governance and enforcement.  
 
The next section, part C, commences with an overview of enforcement. The discussion focuses 
on two elements, namely: ‘why enforcement and what is enforcement’ in relation to corporate 
governance. In so doing, a rudimentary framework of enforcement mechanisms is developed and 
an overview of literature on private enforcement versus public enforcement is provided. The 
discussion also highlights some of the important elements needed for enforcement. After 
establishing an understanding of enforcement it focuses on whether private enforcement should 
be favoured over public enforcement and vice versa. In part D, the paper summarises the 












1.5 Objectives of the research paper 
This paper aims to – 
 highlight the developments of the Company Law reform that has unfolded in South 
Africa, particularly focusing on developments relating to corporate governance; 
 provide an overview of corporate governance; 
 evaluate the enforcement framework as it relates to corporate governance with the aim of 
ascertaining whether  it is capable of protecting providers of capital finance; 
 determine whether South Africa should favour private enforcement as opposed to public 
enforcement to entrench good corporate governance; and 
 make recommendations where necessary.  
1.6 Methodology 
 
The envisaged research is not of an empirical nature, but involves a literature study of books, 
journal articles, legislation and so forth.  The study aims to critically analyse the various relevant 
empirical studies that has been conducted. This approach, however, is not without its 
shortcomings. The obvious limitation is that it only focuses on one aspect of corporate 
governance, namely: the protection of shareholders. The other is the reliance on empirical 
evidence of developed countries. Nevertheless, the approach serves as a good departure point to 





















PART B  
 
2. GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
‘As demand for investment  funds increases in developed and developing nations, and barriers to the free flow of 
capital fall, policy makers have come to recognise that corporate governance is relevant to the ability to attract 




As indicated in part A and in the quotation above, good corporate governance assures providers of 
corporate finance that their investments will be protected. Before an investigation can be launched 
into enforcement strategies and more specifically whether South Africa should favour private 
enforcement as opposed to public enforcement, it is necessary to ascertain whether South Africa has 
the enforcement framework that assures public investors that their assets will be protected.   
 
2.1 Overview corporate governance 
 
Corporate governance has emerged as an important subject. The importance of the subject is 
recognised globally and has been spurred on by, amongst others, a series of high-profile business 
scandals, globalisation and the recent financial crisis.4
 
  
The concept of corporate governance was born out of the conflict of interests between a 
company’s owners and its hired managers. This conflict arose when the ownership of companies 
became separated from the control of the company, which meant that the firm’s owners 
(principals) no longer managed the company, since the responsibility to manage the company 
was shifted to the managers (agents) of the company. The agency problem5
                                                   
3 Gregory and Simms Corporate Governance: What it is and Why it matters (1999) at 1. 
 gave rise to a 
4 Tshepo Mongalo The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a fundamental research topic in South Africa 
(2003) at 175-178. 
5 In its most basic sense an agency-problem is a term adopted to depict a situation where the well-being of one 















Corporate governance was consequently introduced to provide meaningful protection to the 
principals by guarding against opportunistic behaviour by some agents. This protection was 
essentially introduced to ensure that agents control companies in ways that will serve the 
interests of their principals.7
 
 
Despite the prominence of corporate governance in the modern world, the concept is not new.8 The 
principles underlying corporate governance are as old as company law itself and can thus be traced 
back to the 17th Century – a case in point is the incorporation of the Dutch-East Indian Company (the 
VOC). The incorporation of the VOC saw the first issue of shares to members of the public. 
Consequently, giving rise to the agency problem where ownership of the company was separated 
from the control of the company. Pursuant to this occurrence, the buying and selling of shares 
became a popular practice.9
 
  
Despite its long history, new corporate governance principles are still being incorporated into the 
system. This is primarily as a consequence of reforms. To highlight the distinction between the new 
corporate governance principles and the established corporate governance principles, Mongalo 
(2003) categorizes these principles as belonging to either the self-regulatory regime or the traditional 
corporate governance regime. This traditional corporate governance regime (also referred to as the 
conventional regime) generally refers to established principles that have long been provided for in 
common law or company legislation. As a result, these principles of corporate governance are 
generally backed by legal enforcement. These include: fiduciary duties of directors, requirements for 
special resolutions, the role of shareholders and company meetings. It is important to highlight that 
even though the traditional corporate governance regime is backed by legal enforcement it does not 
necessarily mean that the enforcement is effective. On the other hand, self-regulatory regime refers 
                                                   
6 John Armour, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and 
Functional Approach (2009) at 3.   
7Ibid.   
8 Tshepo Mongalo The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a fundamental research topic in South Africa 
(2003) at 178-179. 











to the new corporate governance principles that are concerned with, amongst others, the 
improvement of the rules and principles of company direction; and development of stricter checks 
and balances to alleviate wrongdoings of those engaged in corporate decision making. The objective 
of these principles is to equip companies to operate in the modern environment. This corporate 
governance regime is backed by codes of good practice.10
 
 This matter will be expanded upon later 
under item 2.2.  
2.1.1 What is corporate governance?  
 
Corporate governance has a number of interpretations.11 Experts in the area prescribe the 
boundaries of the subject in different ways and therefore are unable to agree on a universal 
definition. For the purpose of the research paper, two approaches to corporate governance will be 
highlighted, which are essentially regarded as the ‘modern views’ of corporate governance.12
 
 
Some experts, including Sir Adrian Cadbury, define corporate governance as ‘the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled’.13
                                                   
10 Tshepo Mongalo Self Regulation versus Statutory codification: Should the new regime of corporate governance 
be accorded statutory backing? (2004) at 267. 
 In terms of this definition, the main objective of 
corporate governance is to ensure that the investments of those who supply a company with 
finances are increased exponentially. A number of consequences flow from adopting this 
definition of corporate governance. Firstly, it would mean that a director’s performance will be 
dependant on the rate of return which the investor receives. In other words, if the investor 
receives a significant return on his or her investment then a director has automatically performed 
well. Conversely, if the return is negative or insignificant then it implies that the director has 
failed to perform. Secondly, when a director engages in corporate decision making, the director 
is only obliged to consider the interest of shareholders, disregarding the interest of other 
11 “[C]orporate governance is one of those fundamental yet nebulous concepts which may claim to understand and 
implement but which few can define comprehensively or even succinctly.” Horrigan Fault lines in the intersection 
between corporate governance and social responsibility (2002) at 515. 
12 Tshepo Mongalo Self Regulation versus Statutory codification: Should the new regime of corporate governance 
be accorded statutory backing?  (2004) at 265.  
13 Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Chairperson: Sir Adrian Cadbury) Final Report 











stakeholders, which include employees and suppliers. This approach to corporate governance is 
considered to be the narrow approach to corporate governance.14
 
  
The ‘broad approach’ to corporate governance views corporate governance as being mainly 
concerned with reaching a balance between economic and social goals. This ‘balancing act’ is 
viewed as the basis for governing and controlling a company. Accepting this view of corporate 
governance infers that the company should be run as a community having regard to all 
stakeholders. Unlike the narrow view of corporate governance, this approach considers the 
interest of all stakeholders. Therefore a company’s success is dependant on reaching a state of 
equilibrium between the interests of all stakeholders. These approaches to corporate governance 
become essential when stakeholders issues are considered.15
 
 
Berglöf (2006) contends that irrespective of the preferred approach, corporate governance is 
primarily a means by which a company can assure investors that it is a well-run institution to which 
investors and lenders can confidently commit their funds.16
 
   
Now that the approaches to corporate governance have been outlined, the discussion will focus 
on what is meant by good corporate governance. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation 









Spurred on by the Asian financial crisis, the Business Sector Advisory Group recommended that 
the OECD promote and further articulate these four core standards of corporate governance. 
                                                   
14 Tshepo Mongalo Self Regulation versus Statutory codification: Should the new regime of corporate governance 
be accorded statutory backing?  (2004) at 265-266. 
15 Supra at 266. 
16 Erik Berglöf A Note on Corporate Governance and Development (2006) at 2. 











Subsequently, in April 1999 a set of corporate governance principles were developed. These 
principles are non-binding and provide guidance on the implementation of good corporate 
governance.18
 
 They include:    
 Fairness: The concept of fairness can be broken down into two principles. The first 
principle states that: ‘The corporate governance framework should protect shareholders 
rights.’19 Unpacking this principle, it is evident that it considers shareholders as property 
owners. As such, shareholders have a right to hold and convey their interest in the 
company. Therefore to establish good corporate governance requires laws, procedures 
and practices that protect this property right and ‘ensure secure methods of ownership, 
registration and free transferability of shares.’20
Principle II states that: ‘The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable 
treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All 
shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their 
rights.’
 This principle also recognises that 
shareholders have participatory rights on key corporate decisions. These include: election 
of directors, the approval of mergers and acquisitions, using of proxies for voting. 
21 This principle refers to the protection of minority shareholders against 
misappropriation of assets or self dealing by controlling shareholders, managers or 
directors. This protection can be achieved by rules that impose fiduciary duties or 
regulate transaction by corporate insiders and mechanisms that enforce these rules. An 
example of such a mechanism is a derivative action.22
 
 
 Transparency: Principle IV states that : ‘The corporate governance framework should 
ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the 
corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership and governance of 
the company.’23
                                                   
18 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) at 4. 
 This principle recognises that stakeholders, which include shareholders 
and investors, need information on the company’s financial performance, corporate 
19 Supra t 17. 
20 Gregory and Simms Corporate Governance: What it is and why it matters (1999) at 8. 
21 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) at 17. 
22 Gregory and Simms Corporate Governance: What it is and why it matters (1999) at 8. 











governance practices and corporate ownership. Having access to relevant information 




 Accountability: Principle V states that: ‘The corporate governance framework should 
ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by 
the board and the board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders.’25
 
 This 
principle encapsulates directors’ legal duties, which they owe to the company and its 
shareholders. Furthermore, the principle recognises that the board is responsible for 
monitoring managers and holding them accountable for the use of the company’s assets. 
 Responsibility: Principle III states that: ‘ The corporate governance framework should 
recognise the rights of stakeholders as established by law and encourage active co-
operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and 
sustainability of financially sound enterprises.’26 This principle recognises that a 
company must comply with the laws and regulations of the country within which it 
operates.27
 
     
It is also important to note that corporate governance practices vary across nations. This is as a 
consequence of ‘distinct societal values, different ownership structures, business circumstances 
and competitive conditions’.28 Good corporate governance therefore has a unique meaning for a 
specific country. Good corporate governance is impacted by the ‘strength and enforceability of 
contracts, the political standing of shareholders and debt holders, and the development and 
enforcement capacity of the legal system’.29 Furthermore, there are also distinct differences in 
the corporate governance challenges faced by developed, developing and emerging countries.30
                                                   
24 Gregory and Simms Corporate Governance: What it is and why it matters (1999) at 8. 
 
In emerging and developing countries the corporate governance challenge generally involves 
‘balancing incentives for controlling shareholders and protecting minority rights against actions 
25 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) at 22. 
26 Supra at 21. 
27 Available on http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,3343,en_2649_34813_31530865_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
28 Gregory and Simms Corporate Governance: What it is and why it matters (1999) at 6. 
29 Ibid. 











by insider shareholders’31 whereas the corporate governance challenge in developed countries 
relates to rendering managers accountable to shareholders.32
 
 
It follows that understanding what constitutes good corporate governance must therefore 
consider the legal environment and cultural values of a specific country. As such, establishing 
good corporate governance is largely a matter to be considered by the specific nation and the 
private sector that operates within that society.  
 
2.1.2 Why corporate governance?  
 
‘The governance of the corporation is now as important in the world economy as the government of countries.’  




This quotation encapsulates the importance of implementing good corporate governance. There 
are a number of reasons why good corporate governance is a prerequisite for a well-run company. 
The first reason for implementing good corporate governance is to enhance the ability of 
companies to attract lower-cost investment capital. Corporate governance achieves this by 
improving both local and international investor confidence. In other words, good corporate 
governance assures investors that their assets will be used as agreed upon. This benefit of 
corporate governance was affirmed in a study conducted by McKinsey and Company in June 
2000, where it was shown using empirical evidence that effective corporate governance attracts 
investors.34 The study concluded that 80% of shareholders in the United Kingdom were prepared 
to pay a premium price for shares in a company that has established good corporate governance. 
This study also found that 75% of investors equated financial performance with good board 




                                                   
31 Ibid. 
32 John Armour Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and Empirical Assessment at 1. 
33 James D Wolfensohn A Battle for Corporate Honesty (1999) at 38.  
34 McKinsey and Company Investor Opinion Survey on Corporate Governance (June 2000).  











Secondly, implementing good corporate governance relates to the maximisation of wealth. This 
is achieved by promoting the efficient use of resources both within the company and the larger 




Societies are relying on companies to play a key role in economic growth and development. In 
this regard, good corporate governance also enhances a firm’s ability to meet societal 




Fourthly, implementing good corporate governance plays a pivotal role in protecting investors. It 
is reasoned that when good corporate governance is implemented it facilitates oversight and 
holds the board and management accountable for the management of the corporation. This 
oversight and accountability together with the efficient use of resources, improved access to 
lower-cost capital and increased responsiveness to societal needs and expectations – should 
ensure improved corporate performance. It is noted that good corporate governance may not 
guarantee a company improved corporate performance but it can improve a company’s chance of 
survival. Moreover, a well-run company is less susceptible to takeover, mergers or bankruptcy. 
The empirical evidence that has been undertaken to link good corporate governance to corporate 
performance has revealed contradictory findings. Experts in the field have argued that the link 
between good corporate governance and corporate finance makes intuitive sense.38 It is also 
worth noting that the evidence collected from recent corporate failures, which include Enron, 




                                                   
36 Gregory and Simms Corporate Governance: What it is and why it matters (1999) at 4. 
37 Supra at 3-4. 
38 Supra at 5. 











Another reason to implement good corporate governance is to reduce the likelihood of corruption 
in business dealings. Even though good corporate governance cannot prevent corruption, it does 
allow for the early detection of corrupt practices.40
 
 
These benefits of good corporate governance are ensured by, amongst others, – 
 
 demanding that directors adhere to their fiduciary duties; namely: good faith, care, skill 
and diligence;41
 adopting standards for transparency, particularly regulating the interaction between the 
company and the investors or creditors; 
 
 insisting on transparency in corporate transactions, in accounting and auditing 
procedures, in all individual business transactions; and 
 developing sound company strategy and ensuring that mergers and acquisitions are 
executed for sound business reasons, and that the rewards are linked to performance.42
 
 
2.2. Corporate governance framework in South Africa 
 
To assess whether South Africa has the enforcement framework that assures public investors that 
their assets will be protected, the discussion will now primarily focus on the developments of the 
four main elements upon which the foundation of good corporate governance rests, namely: 
 the Companies Act No 71 of 2008 (the new Companies Act);   
 common Law; 
 King III; and 
 other statutes. 
 
This discussion departs with the findings of empirical work undertaken by Deutsche Bank 
Securities Inc. in which they sought to evaluate corporate governance in South Africa and the 
comments and recommendations made in King II. This valuation by Deutsche Bank Securities 
Inc. was conducted in August 2002. At that time already they held, with the support of empirical 
                                                   
40 Holly J. Gregory and Marsha E. Simms Corporate Governance: What it is and Why it matters (1999) at 5. 
41 Mervyn King The Corporate Citizen (2006) at 126. 











evidence that South Africa was a leader, amongst emerging markets, in the implementation and 
enforcement of corporate governance standards.43 They also noted that the challenges facing the 
corporate governance framework at the time included: enforcement, lack of awareness by 
directors of their responsibilities and rising levels of corruption.44 In respect of enforcement, they 
note that the existing legislation at the time was strong, even comparable to developed countries. 
However, South Africa suffers from weak enforcement partly due to a lack of financial resources 
attached to the task. Furthermore, they indicated that the judicial system is loaded with 
unresolved cases that impact on its ability to resolve cases speedily.45
 
   
King II also addressed factors contributing to the inefficiencies in enforcing conventional 
corporate governance principles. They identified a lack of resources and challenges associated 
with the criminal justice system as influencing the effectiveness of conventional corporate 
governance principles. King II explained that the criminal justice system is under-resourced and 
in instances where resources were available, it was not effectively used. King II also identified 
the poor resources available at the South African Police Services (SAPS) as contributing to weak 
enforceability. It was explained that the SAPS did not have the necessary expertise to investigate 
commercial cases nor were prosecutors adequately trained to prosecute commercial cases. This 
view also ties in with the sentiment to de-criminalise company law.46
 
  
To improve enforceability, King II47
 
 made the following recommendations: 
 The office of the Registrar of Companies needs to be adequately resourced to regulate 
compliance with the Companies Act; 
 Enforcing and improving civil remedies; and 




                                                   
43 Deutsche Bank Inc Global Corporate Governance: Valuing Corporate Governance in South Africa (2003) at 40. 
44 Supra at 41. 
45 Supra at 39-42. 
46 Department of Trade and Industry South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate 
Law Reform (2004). 
47 Report on Corporate Governance (King II) 2002. 











2.2.1 The Companies Act 
 
This discussion will focus on the developments in respect of South Africa’s regulatory 
framework with the view of highlighting its improvements. 
 
The Companies Act No 61 of 1973 is still in operation and is to be replaced by the new 
Companies Act in its entirety. As mentioned earlier, the new Companies Act was promulgated in 
April 2009 and is not yet in operation. At the time of writing this research paper, there was no 
certainty as to when the Act would commence.49
 
  
The promulgation of the new Act was preceded by a reform process that involved a complete 
overhaul of South African Company Law. Despite the comprehensive corporate law reform 
process, it does not infer a complete abolishment of company law jurisprudence. As part of the 
reform process it was decided to retain many provisions of the current law which were found to 
be ‘appropriate for the legal, economic and social context of South Africa as a constitutional 
democracy and open economy’.50
 
 
Important features of the new Act include: 
 
 modernises company law and aligns it with international best practice, especially in 
relation to corporate governance, communications and public companies; 
 simplifies company law by -   
- introducing simpler administrative and other procedures;  
- reducing the number of provisions from 450 to 225;  
- using simple language; and 
- introducing simpler administrative and other procedures; 
                                                   
49 Also worth noting is that draft regulations in respect of the Act was published. However, there was much uproar 
about its completeness and applicability. This could further delay the commencement date of the Act.  
50 The Department of Trade and Industry South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for 











 promotes transparency, high standards of corporate governance and accountability, 
particularly by directors and other officers, including minimum standards for annual 
reports; 
 gives greater protection to minority shareholders; 
 codifies the fiduciary duties of directors and liabilities of directors;  
 includes a complete overhaul of provisions relating to Takeovers; and 




For the purpose of this research paper, focus will primarily be placed on the provisions ensuring 
enforcement. This discussion in itself will be divided into general provisions and provisions that 
establish regulatory agencies. 
 
(a) General provisions 
 
In this regard, the discussion will focus on chapters 2 and 7 of the new Companies Act. Chapter 
2 deals with ‘Formation, Administration and Dissolution of Companies’ and includes governance 
of companies whilst chapter 7 deals with remedies and enforcement.  
 
Chapter 2 retains most of the provisions found in the old Companies Act relating to corporate 
governance; however the following changes were incorporated: 
 
 quorum of  25% is required at a general meeting (s 73); 
 shareholders are entitled to participate in meetings by electronic communication (s 
74); 
 the duties of directors were codified (s 75-78); and  
  the provisions relating to conflict of interest, directors’ liability, indemnities and 
insurance were supplemented (s 77-78). 
 
                                                   











Of particular importance is the codification of directors’ duties.52 In order to ensure that directors 
know what their duties are and what is expected of them, the new Companies Act attempts to 
create certainty by partially codifying the duties of directors. Whether this is the best means 
available to increase awareness around directors’ duties continues to be a subject of an ongoing 
debate. This debate, however, is not related to the objective of this research paper. It is safe to 
say that  the ‘codification does not entail a rigid fixation of law, but a proposed code with 
provisions  that if used correctly by courts, can ultimately lead to the development of the law, 
based on existing principles of South African common law.’53 To supplement this view, a 
distinction can be drawn between complete codification and partial codification. Complete 
codification cannot accommodate an environment that is subject to change as opposed to partial 
codification that allows for some room for development of common law since it is based on 
general principles of law. The option chosen by the new Companies Act therefore allows for 
some room for development of the common law. 54
 
 
Chapter 7 makes provision for remedies and enforcement. Like its predecessor, the chapter also 
provides that the High Court remains the main medium for remedies. It also retains the existing 
remedies whilst introducing additional remedies, which includes: 
 right to seek a declaratory order as to a shareholder’s rights (s 161); 
 right to submit an application to have a director declared delinquent or under probation (s 
162); 
 appraisal rights for dissenting shareholders to certain actions (s 164);  
 Derivative action; which gives a person other than a company the right to bring legal action 
in the name of the company – (s 165 - statutory derivative action)55
 improves the regime to protect ‘whistle-blowers’ and establishes a stronger right for an 
aggrieved person to address the court on a matter before it – (s 159).  
; and 
 
It is worth highlighting the inclusion of a derivative action in the new Company Law Act since 
this action authorises a minority shareholder to commence legal action in the name of the 
                                                   
52 Sections 75-78 of the Companies Act 71 of 2009. 
53 Walter Geach Statutory, Common Law and Other Duties of Directors (2009) at 8. 
54 Supra at 9. 











company. This action is pursued to redress the wrongs done to the company.56 In contrast to the 
normal rules of corporate action – the decision to commence legal action in the name of the 
company – a derivative action does not require approval by the board of directors or by the 
company’s general meeting. This action bypasses these formal procedures and allows a minority 
shareholder to bring an action on behalf of the company. A derivative action therefore amounts 
to an exception to the ordinary principle of corporation, since it does not subscribe to the 
majority rule principle. On this basis, this should be regarded as a powerful deterrent.57
 
 
It is important to note that there is a distinct difference between the derivative actions as 
contained in the new Act compared to the derivative action of the previous Act. As indicated 
above, s 165 of the new Companies Act regulates derivate actions. Section 165(1) abolishes the 
common law derivative action whilst s 165(2)-(6) provides for the new statutory derivative 
action. Unlike s 266 of the previous Act, s 165 is much broader in its application and spells out a 
different procedure to be followed. Also s 165 widens the net of parties that can initiate a 
derivative action. Under s 266 of the previous Act, the initiation of derivative actions was limited 
to shareholders only whereas s 165(2) allows the following persons to initiate proceedings – 
 
 a shareholder or a potential shareholder of the company or of a related company - s 
165(2) (a); 
 a director or prescriber officer of the company or of a related company - s 165(2) (b); 
 a registered trade union or another representative of the company’s employees - s 165(2) 
(c); or  
 person who has been granted permission to protect the ‘legal rights of that other person’ - 
s 165(2) (d).  
 
It is also worth noting that both the remedies provided by s 161 and s 162 are new to the 
company law set-up; as they were not found in the previous legislation.58
 
 
                                                   
56 S 165 of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
57John Armour Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the UK and US (2009) at 19-
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(b) Regulatory agencies  
 
This discussion focuses on the main functions of the regulatory agencies identified in Chapter 8 
of the new Companies Act and also highlights the remedies and enforcement procedures which 
these entities will make available to any person entitled to apply for relief. This chapter 
establishes one new institution, namely the Companies Tribunal and transforms the three existing 
entities, namely the Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office (CIPRO), the 




(i) The Companies and Intellectual Property Commission 
 
Section 185 of the new Companies Act establishes the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission (the Commission) as a juristic person. This agency has evolved from CIPRO. The 
main difference between the Commission and CIPRO is that the Commission’s functions and 
powers have significantly been expanded. 
 
The Commission will be tasked with – 
 
 enforcing the Companies Act. The enforcement excludes matters that fall in the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Takeover Regulation Panel. In so doing, the Commission can promote 
voluntary resolution of disputes between a company and shareholder or director; and 
monitor compliance with the new Companies Act. It is also important to note the 
enforcement of the new Companies Act entails receiving or initiating complaints 
concerning alleged contravention of the new Companies Act, evaluating complaints and 
initiating investigations into complaints – s 187 (2).  
 promoting the reliability of financial statements by monitoring patterns of compliance 
with, and contraventions of, financial reporting standards – s 187 (3).  
 the registration and deregistration of companies, external companies and intellectual 
rights. This function includes establishing and maintaining information concerning 
                                                   











companies and making the information available to the public and to other organs of state. 
This information should be kept in relevant registers in the prescribed form and manner – 
s 187(4); and 
 accrediting a juristic person or an association of persons, with or without conditions, that 
functions mainly to provide conciliation, mediation or arbitration services – s 166(4) (a).  
The Commission must  also monitor the effectiveness of any accredited person or an 
association relative to the purpose and policies of the Companies  Act – s 166(4)(b).  
 
Furthermore, the Minister may issue policy directives to the Commission regarding the 
application, administration and enforcement of the new Companies Act. The Commission may 
also receive directions from the Minister regarding investigations to be conducted into alleged 
contraventions of the Companies Act.60
 
 
The order issued by the Commission could have the status of a High Court order provided that 
certain procedural requirements are met.61
 
     
(ii) The Companies Tribunal 
 
Section 193 of the New Companies Act establishes the Companies Tribunal (the Tribunal) as a 
juristic person with jurisdiction throughout South Africa. 
 
The functions of the Companies Tribunal include: 
 
 Adjudicating in relation to any application that may be made to it, and make and order as 
provided for in the Companies Act in respect of such an application; and 
 Assisting in the resolution of disputes.62
 
 
Importantly, s 195 (7) provides that a ‘decision by the Companies Tribunal on a decision, notice 
or order by the Commission is binding on the Commission, subject to any review by the court’. It 
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is important to note that an order of the Companies Tribunal may be filed in the High Court as an 
order of the court – s 195(8).  
  
(iii) The Takeover Regulation Panel 
 
Section 196 of the new Companies Act also establishes a Takeover Regulation Panel (‘the 
Panel’) as a juristic person with powers similar to the existing Securities Regulation Panel. 
 
The Panel is responsible to – 
 regulate any affected transaction and offers;  
 investigate complaints regarding affected transactions and offers; and 
 apply for a court order to wind up a company.63
 
 
Moreover, the Minister, in consultation with the Panel, is responsible for prescribing the 
Takeover regulations which will provide, amongst others, for the compliance with and 
enforcement of the administration, operation and procedures of the Panel, prescribed fees and 




The Panel also has the power insofar as to ensure compliance with, amongst others the  Takeover 
Regulations, to issue a compliance order that prohibit or require any action by a person, or order 
a person to divest of an acquired asset, or account for profits – s 119(5). Furthermore, s 119(6) 
provides that the Panel may exempt an offeror to an affected transaction or an offer from the 
application of any provision if -  
 there is no reasonable potential of the affected transaction prejudicing the interests of any 
existing holder of a regulated company’s securities,  
 the cost of compliance is disproportionate relative to the value of the affected transaction, 
or  
 doing so is otherwise ‘reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances’.  
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This exemption may be ‘wholly or partially’, and or subject to conditions. 
 
(iv) The Financial Reporting Standards Council 
 
Section 203 of the new Companies Act establishes the Financial Reporting Standards Council 
(the Council) .The functions of the Council include – 
 receiving and considering any relevant information relating to the reliability of, and 
compliance with, financial reporting standards. This function include adapting 
international reporting standards for local circumstances and considering 
recommendations from the Commission for amendments to financial reporting standards 
– s 204 (a), 
 advising the Minister on matters relating to financial reporting standards – s 204(b); and 
 consulting with the Minister on the regulations which establishes financial reporting 
standards s 204 (c). 
 
From the above it is clear that the new Companies Act provides for various alternative 
procedures to address complaints; regulate disputes, address contraventions of the Companies 
Act and enforce provisions of a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation and rules, other than 
seeking relief via the High Court. Examples of alternative procedures for addressing complaints 
or securing rights include the following:  
 the Companies Tribunal or an accredited entity can resolve disputes through an 
alternative dispute resolution;   
 an application can be made to the Companies Tribunal to adjudicate a matter which falls 
within its jurisdiction as determined by the Companies Act; and 
 the Commission and the Panel are also empowered to receive and investigate complaints 
and to issue compliance notices.65
 
  
It is anticipated that the new Companies Act will – 
 
                                                   











 improve regulatory oversight, enforcement and redress for shareholders especially 
minorities; 
 improve transparency and accountability of public interest firms;  
 reduce regulatory burden for small and medium sized firms; and 
 reduce cost of registration and maintenance of companies.66
 
 
2.2.2 Common law 
 
Common law refers to law which is not contained in the statute books of a country but which 
nevertheless over time and through wide acceptance has gained the force of law. The common 
law which pertains to companies arose primarily as a result of judicial interpretation of the Act 




In addition to the statutory duties prescribed by the Act, there are certain common law duties, 
also known as fiduciary duties, incumbent on the directors and officers of a company. A 
fiduciary duty simply means that a director of a company must exercise the powers and perform 
the functions of director in good faith and in the best interests of the company. Also the directors 
owe the duty to the company itself and not to the shareholders or stakeholders.68
 
 
In the event that a director breaches his fiduciary duty, a company has three primary remedies, 
namely: 
 
 a right to claim any profit or business opportunity that was obtained or kept; 
 a right, in certain circumstance to set aside transactions entered into; and 




                                                   
66 Department of Trade and Industry South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate 
Law Reform (2004). 
67 Walter Geach Statutory, Common Law and Other Duties of Directors (2009) at 9. 
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2.2.3 The King Report on Corporate Governance (King III) 
 
King III was published in February 2009 and stakeholders were invited to comment on the draft. 
This report was given effect to as a result of the recent corporate law reform process in South 




As was the case with King I and King II, the Committee aimed to be at the forefront of corporate 
governance. This objective has arguably been realised by its proposal to report annually on how 
a company has affected the economic life of the community in which it operates.71 In addition, 
King III also recommends that a company’s reporting should be extended to include a reference 
on its efforts to improve the positive aspects and eradicate any possible negative aspects that 
impacts on the economic life of the community in which it operates.72
 
 
Another distinguishing feature of King III is that it broadens the scope of corporate governance 
in South Africa by emphasizing leadership, sustainability and being a good corporate citizen73. 
Moreover, King III places emphasis on the following emerging governance trends; namely: 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), Risk based internal audit, IT governance, Shareholders 
and remuneration, and Evaluation of the board of directors and the board committees. In respect 
of ADR, the report supports controlled mediation to resolve disputes. In the event that the ADR 
is unsuccessful, the report recommends expedient arbitration. It is also worth noting that an 




King III states that the Code applies to all companies ‘regardless of the manner or form of 
incorporation or establishment’, and has opted for an ‘apply or explain’ governance 
framework.75
                                                   
70 Andries Brink Corporate governance and the Companies Act (2009) at 6. 
 This means that a company is not compelled to follow King III strictly, the 
71 DLA Update: Company Law (2009) at 1. 
72Andries Brink Corporate governance and the Companies Act (2009) at 7. 
73Andries Brink Corporate governance and the Companies Act (2009) at 7 and Chapter 2 of the King Report III. 












company can deviate from the principles contained in King where the company believes it is in 
the best interest of the company but it must explain. Hence, even if a company fails to 
mechanically implement the principles in King III, by explaining the basis for its decision will 
still render it consistent with the spirit of King III. This arrangement empowers stakeholders to 
be in a position to challenge the board on the level of governance in an organisation. There is a 
view which holds that this approach is more burdensome. It is explained that this approach goes 
beyond the ‘tick box compliance’ approach to an approach that involves more consideration of 
what is actually done to implement the code.76 Another view sees this approach as deliberately 
equating the principles and recommendations to that of law.77
 
 
The corporate governance framework recommended by King III is principles-based. As such 
there is no one size fits all approach and even though entities are strongly encouraged to adopt 
the principles contained in King III as far as practically possible. This principles-based approach 
takes into consideration the different size, nature and complexity of various organisations. It has 
been argued that this approach avoids some of the shortcomings evident in the United States 
where a ‘one size fits all approach’ was initially adopted.78
 
  
The main criticism levelled against this Report is based on the fact that the report is simply a set 
of principles as opposed to laws and therefore could easily be circumvented. In response to this 
view, it has been argued that the market place should be the primary compliance enforcer and 
therefore there is no need to give these principles legislative backing. The latter view 
encapsulates the approach taken by King III. These sentiments capture an on ongoing debate 
which centres on the enforceability of the Code.79
 
  
The Codes of good corporate principles, in particular King II, have indicated that new principles 
of good corporate governance do not require further legislation. The reasoning behind this 
preference is based on the idea that the Code should be self-regulatory for principles that do not 
enjoy legal remedies. The main reason afforded for making the Code non-prescriptive is that 
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77 Walter Geach Statutory, Common Law and Other Duties of Directors (2009) at 6. 
78 Andries Brink Corporate governance and the Companies Act (2009) at 7. 











significant differences exist between companies. In other words, the Codes recognise that some 
companies are better positioned to implement the recommendations contained in the Code whilst 
other companies are not capable of implementing them. The system of self regulation is thus 
favoured for its flexibility.80
 
    
For purposes of completeness it will be useful to highlight the advantages and disadvantages for 
adopting a self regulatory system. In a paper entitled ‘Standards of Self-Regulation of the 
Securities Markets’ the International Capital Markets Group identifies a number of advantages of 
self regulation.81
 Unlike the statutory system, self-regulation allows for the imposition of ethical standards; 
 These include: 
 A self-regulatory system has built in checks and balances which facilitates oversight; 
 A self-regulatory system is a more complete system as opposed to the statutory approach. 
It is also more cost effective to operate and implement; and 
  Such a system is also based on a willingness to be regulated.82
 
 
In addition, it is recognised that such a system is more flexible than a system with legal backing. 
In other words, a self regulatory system is amenable to change and can therefore keep abreast 
with changes in the corporate world. This characteristic is not true for a system that enjoys legal 
backing. The disadvantage of the statutory approach is that it is based on the notion that ‘one size 
fits all’ approach. As has been highlighted before, this is not the case in the corporate world.83
  
  
In contrast, this self-regulatory system is susceptible to non-compliance since it is not associated 
with serious sanctions. This shortcoming is exacerbated in instances where compliance is of an 
urgent nature. Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and affirmative actions have been 
identified as initiatives that required urgent attention. In respect of both these initiatives the 
corporate world was slow to respond and calls to legislate on these issues were intensified to cure 
the lack of compliance.84
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81 Supra at 275. 
82 Supra at 275-276. 
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It is also worth noting that companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) are 
required to divulge their extent to which they are complying with King II and where companies 
deviate from the Code, they are required to explain their deviance. Also the JSE has revised its 
listing requirements in 2000 to improve corporate governance. The new listing requirements 
include: 
 directors of companies are required to complete a “fit and proper” declaration prior to 
the listing of the company; 
 directors are required to disclose their dealings in shares of the company; 
 pyramid companies or companies with low-voting shares will no longer be 
accommodated on the JSE; and 
 the results of South African Companies must be reported in compliance with the South 
African generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP) whilst the results of non South 




2.4.4 Other key legislation 
 
In addition, to the provisions of the Companies Act, common law and King III there are several 
pieces of legislation that have been enacted, which impacts on corporate governance in South 
Africa. In a survey conducted by KPMG in 2004 entitled ‘Survey of Integrated Sustainability 
Reporting in South Africa’ it was noted that from 1994 to 2004 approximately 60 Acts were 
passed or substantially revised that had a direct impact on corporate governance.86
                                                   
85 JSE Listing Requirements – Service Issue 2 (2009). 
  
86 These include: 
 Closed Corporations Act No 69 of 1984 
 Competition Act No 89 of 1998, 
 Copyright Act No 98 of 1978 
 Trade Marks Act No 194 of 1993 
 Patents Act No 57 of 1978 
 Banks Act No 94 of 1990 
 Securities Services Act No 36 of 2004 
 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act No 37 of 2002 
 Collective Investment Schemes Control Act No 45 of 2002 
 Financial Intelligence Centre Act No 38 of 2001 
 Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act No 28 of 2001 
 Income Tax Act No 58 of 1962 
 Value-added Tax Act No 89 of 1991 
 Insider Trading Act No of 1998 











 In light of the developments that have taken place in the Corporate Law arena and the corporate 
governance that has been identified by both King II and the Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., the 
researcher argues that many of the concerns around the enforcement framework in respect of 
corporate governance were addressed. For instance, the challenge relating to the judicial system 
struggling with backlogs seems to be addressed by the new Companies Act, which provides for a 
number of alternative dispute mechanisms.  
 
Furthermore,  the previous evaluation of corporate governance in South Africa, which saw it as a 
‘reasonably good legal and institutional infrastructure for corporate governance’, and the modernised 
and simplified regulatory framework, leads one  to conclude that South Africa has the corporate 
governance enforcement framework that assures public investors that their assets will be protected.87
 
   
2.4.5 Comparison between South Africa and United Kingdom – enforcement tools 
 
This part of the discussion compares the enforcement tools available in the UK with the tools 
available in South Africa (SA). This comparison will involve listing the predominant tools in the UK 
and SA. The table below depicts the enforcement mechanisms available in the UK and SA in respect 











                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 













*These sections refer to the Company Acts of the selected countries. 
 
From the figure above, one can make the following deductions – 
 SA and UK have similar mechanisms available in their corporate governance framework; 
and  
 SA and UK enjoy a good blend of enforcement mechanisms. Importantly, the functions 






 United Kingdom South Africa 
Regulatory agencies The Financial Services Authority The Companies and Intellectual 
Property Commission 
The Financial Reporting Review The Financial Reporting Standards 
Council 
The Takeover Panel The Takeover Regulation Panel 
The Department of Business  
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
The Companies Tribunal 
   
Shareholder actions to  
enforce breaches of directors’ 
 fiduciary duties 
Derivative action – s 265 
 
Derivative action– s 165  
 
Unfair prejudice – s 994 Relief from oppressive or prejudicial 
conduct – s 163 
 Application to declare a director  
delinquent or under probation –  
s 162  
   
Code on Corporate Governance Combined Code on Corporate  
Governance 












2.5 Relationship between corporate governance and enforcement 
 
There is a correlation between good corporate governance and enforcement to the extent that 
enforcement influences the overall effectiveness of the corporate governance system.88 As 
indicated earlier, corporate governance is in essence about mitigating the commitment problem 
and balancing the rights and interests of multiple stakeholders. It is enforcement that ensures that 
corporate governance operates effectively. In other words, the benefits of corporate governance 
are enhanced through enforcement. Various studies have been conducted in this regard 
confirming a positive relationship between corporate governance and enforcement. Berglöf and 
Claessens (2003) submit that corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms are ‘intimately 
linked’. They explain that corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms play a pivotal role 
in enhancing a firm’s commitment to their stakeholders and helps with balancing of interests and 
rights of multiple stakeholders. It is observed that a mix of ‘poor enforcement of property rights 
and weak resolution mechanisms give rise to corporate governance problems’.89
 
  
To further highlight the relationship between corporate governance and enforcement, practical 
examples of how enforcement mechanisms have been used to improve corporate governance will 
be discussed. The following mechanisms will be focused on –  
 
 Private Ordering; 
 Enforcement by contract;  
 Mechanisms to get to court;  
 Non-Profit Organisations;  
 Dispute resolution forums; 
 Role of stock exchanges;  
 Lending Institutions; and 
 Other ‘softer’ enforcement mechanism, which include:  rating agencies and the media. 
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Private Ordering: This category can be further divided into three forms of enforcement 
mechanisms, namely: unilateral enforcement arrangements, bilateral enforcement arrangements 
and multilateral enforcement arrangements.90
 
 For the purpose of the research paper, the 
discussions of these informal private enforcement mechanisms will be restricted to the extent 
that they relate to corporate governance. 
Unilateral private informal enforcement arrangements generally refer to initiatives by firms to 
enhance their commitment power. In other words, they use expensive advertising to build their 
reputation and to ultimately mitigate commitment issues. This form of enforcement becomes 
critical in the absence of a well-functioning general enforcement environment. Also, this form of 
enforcement is subject to future interactions, which in itself can pose serious limitations on its 
importance.91
 
   
Bilateral private informal enforcement arrangements occur when two firms strengthen their 
commitment power through interactions with each other. This can happen through partnerships 
between two firms, where the reputation of the one firm can play a critical role in mitigating the 
commitment problem. Other examples of this form of enforcement include: ‘control oriented 
investment’92 or ‘exchange hostages’.93 These examples generally require some duration and 
reputation.94
 
      
Multilateral private informal enforcement arrangements are by far the most important form of 
enforcement for corporate governance. This refers to arrangements where private parties opted to 
establish institutions for ‘collecting and conveying information about the adherence to these 
customs and erect credible punishments for deviations.’95
 
 Examples include: trade associations, 
self-regulatory organisations and stock exchanges.  
                                                   
90 Supra at 21. 
91 Erik Berglof and Stijn Claessens Enforcement and Corporate Governance (2003) at 18. 
92 Refers to one shareholder taking a large stake in a firm. 
93 Refers to the interaction between two companies where one company leaves with the assets belonging to the other. 
These assets are valuable to the provider but not to the party holding the asset. 
94 Erik Berglof and Stijn Claessens Enforcement and Corporate Governance (2003) at 17-18. 











The efficiency of these private enforcement mechanisms in the area of corporate governance is 
dependant on the general institutional environment. For example, private arbitration is more 
likely to work when courts and enforcing agencies work well. It is submitted that the spread of 
firms across boundaries adhering to higher corporate governance standards can facilitate the 
improvement of corporate governance. Also cross-border mergers and acquisitions between 
firms of different standards of corporate governance generally improve the overall standard of 
corporate governance. Notwithstanding, the advantages as listed above, it should be borne in 
mind that the reverse is also possible. In other words, foreign investors could also have an 
adverse impact on corporate governance as was evidenced by some of the corporate governance 
scandals where foreign investors from developed countries took over firms in developing and 
transition countries.96
  
     
Enforcement by contract: Investors can insist that their relationships with companies are 
regulated by contracts, which include provisions pertaining to corporate governance.  These 
agreements could be drafted with the objective of improving corporate governance and in turn 
ensuring that rights of investors are protected. For example, investors can request that the 
contract include the following corporate governance provisions: anti-dilution provisions, board 
representation; board committee requirements (composition and duties); access to information; 
disclosure requirements, change of control rights; and procedures for approving related party 
transactions.97 Concluding a contract of this nature will allow the investors to rely on the court to 
enforce their contractual rights.  Examples of such contracts include: credit agreements, 
securities purchase agreements, shareholder agreements, indentures and other loan agreements 
between investors and companies.98
 
  
Enforcement of this mechanism can be both costly and time consuming. In countries where the 
judiciary poses a serious part of the enforcement challenge, this enforcement mechanism does 
not provide investors with adequate protection. It is also noted that even in countries where the 
enforcement of the contract is effective; it generally favours those with considerable economic 
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power. Moreover, this mechanism is usually only available to those investors with the power to 
extract important rights from the companies in which they invest.99
 
 
Mechanisms to get to Court: A number of procedural devices can be developed to enable 
investors to commence legal action in respect of breaches of their rights as investors. These 
procedural devices include: derivative suits;100 and class action suits101 which facilitate access to 
courts and lower the burdens on individual plaintiffs. In the United States these mechanisms 
have been further enhanced by attorneys who are willing to accept contingency fees (part of the 
award is used to remunerate the attorney) as opposed to charging an hourly rate.102
 
  
In many parts of the world there is a reluctance to introduce the concept of contingency fees into 
the legal fraternity. This reluctance is fuelled by the argument that it will promote unwarranted 
and frivolous suits. Despite the scepticism, it must be borne in mind that devices like 
contingency fees deter wrong behaviour from directors or managers.103
 
 
Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs): The use of non-profit organisations for collective action has 
been identified as alternates to ‘class action contingency litigation’ by individual shareholders. In 
this sense, NPOs provide a group of shareholders with a means of accessing the courts and 




NPOs have also engaged in informal enforcement by threatening to use legal action to ensure 
that companies agree to adopt a range of investor protections. In these instances settlements are 
not restricted to cash rewards but also extend to commitments from the defendant company to 
design improved corporate governance structures.105
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101 This action improves accessibility to courts and lowers the burdens on individual plaintiffs. 
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This mechanism of enforcement is valuable where the level of private enforcement is inadequate 
and government is not susceptible to the idea of improved protection for investors.106
 
 It is not 
currently possible to evaluate the role of NPOs in South Africa due to the fact that it has not been 
discussed in any academic literature.   
Dispute Resolution Forums 
 
The challenges facing developing countries often include ineffective and corrupt courts with 
judges that are inexperienced to deal with investor protection issues. As such, an obvious lacuna 
exits in their enforcement system. To remedy this state of affairs, investors can consider 
negotiating the inclusion of an alternative dispute resolution forum. This will ultimately ensure 
that investors have access to a forum that they can trust.107
 
  
This apparent solution to ineffective and corrupt courts is not without its own shortcomings. 
Including a clause that pre-determines the venue for arbitration could in most instances be costly 
and therefore not viable for small or start-up companies. Also developing countries are generally 




It is also worth noting that arbitration efforts are being extended beyond bilateral agreements, 
which involves the investor and the company. In Brazil, for example, the Novo Mercado (a 
separate segment of the Bovespa Stock Exchange in Brazil) has included arbitration provisions 
into its listing agreements, which provides shareholders of listed companies with enforcement 
rights.109
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 To give effect to this arrangement, the Novo Mercado rules make provision for 
shareholders to refer any disputes relating to listing rules to binding arbitration. As a 
consequence of the nature of the listing rules, which address matters usually the subject of 
107 Supra at 10-11. 
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company law, this arbitration provision gives shareholders a forum to seek redress for violations 
of their rights of shareholders in a forum completely separate from the judicial system.110
 
  
Role of Stock Exchanges 
 
A stock market can be an effective means to enforce corporate governance standards by 
providing a ‘right of action to aggrieved shareholders outside the traditional judiciary’, 
particularly where legal and judicial institutions are inefficient.111
 
  
Lending Institutions  
 
Like stock exchanges, banks too have self-enforcement capabilities and are therefore also 




Millstein (2003) suggests that banks could enhance their lending criteria by offering better 
interest rates for ‘well governed’ companies. In other words, where companies are exercising 
good corporate governance practices, banks could extend additional credit at lower interest rates. 
Similarly, where companies have weak corporate governance practices, banks can refuse to 
extend credit until they reform their governance practices. Millstein explains that such an 
arrangement give banks the ‘ability to compel compliance with governance standards.’113
 
   
 
Other ‘softer’ enforcement mechanisms: Rating agencies, institutional investors and the media 
 
Rating agencies, institutional investors and the media can also play an important role in 
enforcement, despite it not having the formalities associated with courts, arbitration panels, stock 
exchanges and lending institutions and so forth.114
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Rating agencies can assume the role of an unambiguous yardstick by measuring and monitoring 
progress in respect of corporate governance. By publishing these ratings, rating agencies provide 
clear incentives to promote good governance practices as poor ratings will not attract investment. 
An example of an agency that has developed into an unambiguous yardstick is the Governance 
and Value Creation (GVC) in India. This agency differs in many respects from the Traditional 
Corporate Governance Rating (TCG), which is available in several regulatory jurisdictions.  
Firstly, unlike the TCG rating that focuses on internal processes, the GVC aims to ‘balance 
process assessment with an assessment of good governance’.115 Also TCG rating focuses on the 
treatment of shareholders whilst GVC focuses on the treatment of all stakeholders. Furthermore, 
the TCG rating is either qualitative or historical whilst the GVC focuses on sustainable 
practices.116
 
   
The GVC has a detailed assessment process, which is made up of assessments of governance 
processes, wealth creation, wealth management and wealth sharing. This agency has been 
recognised as a unique initiative and has been gaining good reviews as a result of its forward 
looking measurement of governance and its development of a ‘common language’ for 
understanding corporate processes and their effectiveness.117
 
    
Investor activism has also emerged as a role player in ensuring enforcement with good corporate 
governance standards. The Pensions and Investment Research Consultants Ltd (PIRC) is an 
example of an organisation that provides guidance and gives voice to shareholders’ concerns. 
The PIRC achieved this by developing its own governance principles and then monitoring 
companies’ compliance with these principles. Where companies fail to comply, the PIRC invites 
the management of the company to discuss the matter. This is followed by a recommendation to 
the shareholders in respect of the viability to invest in the company. This process adopted by 
PIRC has been relatively successful judging from the companies that opt to comply with the 
governance principles of the PIRC, instead of receiving a negative recommendation.118
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Furthermore, the media provides an important oversight for the public. Publishing stories of 
companies exercising weak governance practices naturally deters investment. As a consequence, 
the media can play a role in facilitating enforcement and recognition of investor rights.119
 
  
2.6 Summary of part B 
 
Corporate governance has economic value and should not be perceived as an empty gesture to 
shareholders. It should be borne in mind that investors will reward companies that strive to exercise 
good corporate governance. This inevitably facilitates the acquisition of capital. It has been 
established that South Africa has the enforcement framework to assure public investors that their 
assets will be protected. Various enforcement mechanisms were discussed to highlight their role in 
improving the enforcement of good corporate governance. This inevitably leads to a consideration of 
effective ways to enforce shareholder rights within this enforcement framework. In other words, 
does South Africa utilise the correct enforcement strategies to drive good corporate governance and 
derive all the benefits associated with good corporate governance? One aspect of such a debate is 
















                                                   
















‘In the simplest possible characterisation the written laws has no independent function, the only thing that matters is 
what part of laws and regulations are actually enforced.’120
 
 Erik Berglöf and Stijn Claessens  
In part B it was established that good corporate governance protects investors and that the 
protection is bolstered by effective enforcement. In this chapter, the researcher critically 
considers a specific enforcement strategy, namely: whether private enforcement should be 
favoured over public enforcement to protect investors and ultimately strengthen financial 
markets and propel economic growth. To execute such an investigation, the research paper will 
primarily rely on empirical research conducted in the area of securities law.121
 
 
3.1. Overview of enforcement  
 
In the area of corporate governance, enforcement is the primary difference between developed 
and developing countries. In many developing countries ‘laws on books’ have undergone some 
form of reform process but often the enforcement of these laws have not been effective.122
 
 
Companies are repeatedly ignoring written rules relating to corporate governance and 
declarations made by companies to comply are not followed up by actions. This is primarily due 
to a lack of enforcement of relevant rules and regulations. Hence the effectiveness of corporate 
governance rules remains a concern. Policymakers have come to realise that ‘enforcement more 
than regulations and laws-on-books’ is the key challenge facing transition and developing 
countries.123
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Academics, including Berglöf (2003), note that reforming enforcement is an extremely 
complicated exercise but vitally important for development. This challenge is aggravated by the 
lack of research in the enforcement area, particularly in relation to the interaction between laws-
on-books and enforcement.124
 
   
3.1.1. Why enforcement? 
 
The effective enforcement of corporate governance has a critically important role in improving 
markets, which in turn attract and protect investments. This view is reiterated by empirical 
evidence on insider trading, which indicates that ‘it is not the presence of laws but rather actions 
taken against insider trading that help to explain the development of securities markets’.125 
Another study undertaken by Defond and Hung (2003) found that the ‘level of enforcement is 
much more important than quality of laws-on-the-books explaining turnover of chief executive 
officers.’126  This finding does not mean laws are unimportant but that they alone do not 
suffice.127
 
      
It is generally accepted that countries that has better enforcement have stronger financial markets 
regardless of their laws.128
 
  
3.1.2. What is enforcement? 
 
According to Ira M. Millstein (2003), the renowned corporate governance expert, enforcement 
can be defined as ‘the basis for determining whether a violation of investor rights has occurred or 
might occur (whether expressly or explicitly covered by law or regulation), and an apparatus to 
translate these violations into regulatory sanctions or recovery for those harmed.’129
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Pursuant to this definition, effective enforcement is required to address both clear cut violations 
of law and the ambiguities and gaps that the law leaves open. This function of enforcement is 




Fiduciary duties together with enforcement mechanisms form the basis of an effective 
enforcement system. In this context, fiduciary duties spell out the manner in which directors and 
managers are supposed to act. It also sets the standard by which the actions of these parties are 
judged, thus creating a foundation for the enforcement of investor rights. Fiduciary duties 
essentially refer to four fundamental duties, which include: the duty of good faith, care, skill and 
diligence.131 In common law countries, like South Africa, the boundaries of these fiduciary 
duties are interpreted and refined by judges on a case-by-case basis. As such, these duties 
continually evolve alleviating the gaps that exist in law. As for enforcement mechanisms, it 
refers to mechanisms which exist to ensure compliance with the spirit of the law.132
 
   
Since law and regulation are not able to anticipate all future contingencies, it is by its very nature 
incomplete. As a consequence, law and regulation are unable to cater for all potential harmful 
actions. A need therefore exists for tools/mechanisms to ensure that the spirit of the law is 
complied with. It is in this context that both enforcement mechanisms and fiduciary duties play a 
pivotal role because they fill the inevitable gaps and ambiguities created within the law.133
 
  
3.1.3. Enforcement mechanisms 
 
(a) Classification of enforcement mechanisms 
 
There is no uniform classification of enforcement mechanisms. A number of proposals exist in 
this regard. For purposes of this research, the ‘popular method’ will be adopted, distinguishing 
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between private and public enforcement.134 This distinction is essentially based on the character 
of the party initiating the action. Hence, if a private party initiates the action then it is considered 




Differentiating between private enforcement and public enforcement is important. It highlights 
the different incentives that exist between the parties initiating the action. For instance, a public 
enforcer is generally entitled to a fixed salary regardless of the outcome of the enforcement 
action whereas a private enforcer is reliant on the success of the litigation for payment. As a 
consequence, it can be expected that private enforcement will prevail where the cost to litigate is 
relatively low. Similarly, private enforcement will fail where litigation costs are exorbitant. 
Secondly, public agencies are normally centralised and under political control. This is not true 
for private enforcement. John Armour submits that these characteristics provide that public 
enforcement is easier to coordinate. Others argue that the influence of political control makes 
public enforcement susceptible to bribery. 136
 
  
This classification of enforcement mechanisms into private enforcement and public enforcement 
can be further subdivided into – 
 
(a) private enforcement comprising formal and informal private enforcement; and 
 
(b) public enforcement comprising formal and informal public enforcement.137
 
 
In this context, formal enforcement refers to a reliance on legal proceedings to ensure 
compliance whereas informal enforcement refers to securing compliance without recourse to 
legal proceedings. Extending the classification of enforcement mechanisms to include formal and 
informal mechanisms is essential as it makes provision for the enforcement role played by the 
institutional investors. In this regard, Armour (2008) showed via an empirical assessment that 
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institutional investors with the majority of the shares in UK listed companies have used rules and 
norms to ensure low-cost informal interventions to combat corporate governance challenges.138
 
   
It is also important to note that for ‘private enforcers’ the option between formal and informal 
mechanisms is dependant on the relative expertise of courts versus investors and other 
institutional features of the two mechanisms. It is explained that the rules of civil procedure have 
a direct bearing on the success of formal private enforcement, whereas informal private 
enforcement is reliant on the success of the reputation/identity of major investors.139





: Figure II 
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(i) Private enforcement 
 
As indicated earlier, private enforcement refers to actions initiated by private agents, which can 
either secure compliance with or without recourse to legal proceedings. As such, private 
enforcement can further be divided into formal private enforcement and informal private 
enforcement.141
 
   
Importantly, this category of enforcement depends mainly on the imposition of penalties ex 
post142 upon the detection of the misconduct. There are exceptions, for example, the ‘scheme of 
arrangement’ procedure which is provided by s 114 of the new Companies Act. In this regard, 
there are certain instances when the company is required to apply to court for approval of the 
restructuring transaction. If the court is satisfied with the procedural steps taken and 
subsequently sanctions the scheme, it cannot be challenged ex post. Moreover, this category of 




Formal private enforcement: Under formal private enforcement, private agents utilise 
interventions as defined by law or regulation to secure compliance with contracts. This type of 
enforcement therefore involves government creating rules that regulate private conduct but relies 
on private agents to enforce the law. In this context, courts are used to adjudicate disputes and 
the state is relied upon to enforce the final judgment.144 In other words, if a private agent feels 
that his or her rights have been violated, the agent can initiate a private suit and take the 
wrongdoer to court or alternatively refer the matter to an appropriate public agency. Berglöf and 
Claessens (2003) submit that most societies are dependant on this category of enforcement to 
enforce laws and regulation.145
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The efficiency of formal private enforcement depends on a number of factors. Firstly, for this 
category of enforcement to flourish the law must mandate a certain standard. In countries where 
laws and regulations are drafted broadly, without stipulating a certain standard, private formal 
enforcement will fail.146 Secondly, the cost to pursue legal action should not be exorbitant. Also 
for formal private enforcement to be effective, agents need to be incentivised to initiate action. 
This category of enforcement also needs institutions that can impose sanctions. For example: a 
court and a judge; institutions like self-regulatory agencies or authorities.147   Moreover, research 
work found that formal private enforcement mechanisms need the support of government 
interventions and cannot operate optimally on its own.148
 
  
Examples of formal private enforcement include: securities litigation to enforce breaches of 
disclosure laws; shareholder actions to enforce breaches of directors’ fiduciary duties; and 
insolvency litigation relating to breaches of directors’ duties.149
 
         
Informal private enforcement: In contrast, informal private enforcement can be defined as private 
initiatives that ‘secure compliance without recourse to legal proceedings’.150 This primarily 
refers to action taken by stakeholders who contract with companies. These stakeholders include 
investors, customers, employees and suppliers.  These parties can penalise a company by being 
reluctant to enter into agreements with the company. For example, an employee that is unwilling 
to enter into an employment relationship with the company. Similarly, an investor can refuse to 
buy shares or can choose to sell existing shares. This will undoubtedly have a negative impact on 
the company’s share price. Alternatively, stakeholders of a company may be entitled to exercise 
their contractual entitlements that have the effect of penalising individuals liable of wrongdoing. 
An example of such an entitlement is the removal of managers from office following a 
shareholder vote.151
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dissatisfaction with managers’ performance, they automatically depress the share price and 
render managers vulnerable to displacement by takeover.152
 
     
(ii) Public Enforcement 
 
As indicated above, public enforcement refers to initiatives that are undertaken by public 
agencies or bodies. Hence, it specifically refers to all legal and regulatory actions brought by 
organs of state. This category of enforcement includes criminal and civil suits brought by public 
officials and public agencies, and various ex ante153 rights of approval. The latter include 
securities offering statements exercised by either public officials or agencies.154
 
  
Public enforcement can be instigated by a wide variety of public actors which can include local 
prosecutors, The Takeover Panel, The Companies Tribunal, The Companies and Intellectual 
Property Commission. This category, like private enforcement can either secure compliance with 
or without recourse to legal proceedings and can therefore be further subdivided into – 
 Formal public enforcement; and 
 Informal public enforcement. 
 
Formal public enforcement  
 
Formal public enforcement refers to an intervention by a public body or public actor that 
involves ‘judicial or quasi judicial proceedings’.155
 
  
In measuring the importance of these mechanisms Berglöf and Claessens (2003) recognised that 
the efficiency and effectiveness of enforcing institutions such as courts, stock exchanges, self-
regulatory agencies, are challenging to study empirically. It is submitted that efficiency generally 
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refers to ‘outputs relative to inputs’156. An evaluation of the efficiency of courts should include a 
consideration of timelines to conclude a case, accessibility to court, fairness and predictability.157
 
     
Informal public enforcement 
 
On the other hand, informal public enforcement ‘consists of interventions by public bodies that 
do not involve judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings’.158
 
 
A public agency that favours informal public enforcement has the potential to save large sums of 
money that would otherwise have been spent on legal proceedings. Arguably this type of 
enforcement, could allow a public agency to focus its attention on detecting improper conduct as 
opposed to prosecuting those that had already been detected. In the case where informal 
sanctions are effective, informal public enforcement is better positioned to secure compliance as 
opposed to reliance on formal sanctions.159
 
 
Informal public enforcement is commonly executed via the imposition of ‘reputational 
sanctions’.160 These reputational sanctions can take place by publishing a public statement 
highlighting that a firm has failed to comply with a required standard or alerting other firms to 
avoid doing business with the company liable of wrongdoing. These sanctions are more effective 
if carried out by an objective and expert agency, which investigates and publicises the results as 
opposed to a disgruntled stakeholder. Alternatively, the public agency could engage in informal 
talks with the wrongdoer encouraging them to remedy the wrongdoing. In these kinds of 
instances, sanctions are merely mooted and not immediately imposed.161
 
  
It is worth noting that both private enforcement and public enforcement systems have strong 
advantages and serious shortcomings. In respect of private enforcement, its efficiency is 
negatively impacted by being dependant on ‘collective action and free-rider effects among 
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dispersed investors, slow and inaccurate judiciaries, to lawyers’ rent-seeking, and to the potential 
inability of private enforcement’ to secure suitable financial sanctions for wrongdoers. On the 




In contrast, the significance of public enforcement is elevated by its ability to secure financial, 
criminal and reputational sanctions that can deter firms from wrongdoing. As with private 
enforcement, public enforcement also has its shortcomings. A public enforcement system is 
negatively impacted by public officials that are poorly compensated to effectively execute their 
duties. Consequently, this leads to the public agency being susceptible to corruption and also not 
being in a position to secure effective information relating to both general market and specific 
firm conditions. In light of the above, the researcher submits that there is no obvious a ‘priori 
winner’ in this debate.163
 
  This leads us to consider whether private enforcement should be 
favoured to protect investors and ultimately corporate governance. 
The effectiveness of many enforcement mechanisms is directly linked to the degree of 
importance it has been allocated by the political fraternity. Given this simple fix, many countries 
are still grappling to improve the effectiveness of their enforcement of corporate governance. See 
item 3.1.6 which discusses enforcement and the political economy. 
 
3.1.4 Relationship between enforcement mechanisms 
 
Private and public enforcement mechanisms complement each other and should not be perceived 
as substitutes for one another. Experts in the area, including Berglöf and Claessens (2003), 
submit that the ‘effectiveness of private enforcement mechanisms depends on the effectiveness 
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of the public enforcement mechanisms’.164 It is further submitted that public enforcement brings 
down the costs of private enforcement.165
 
  
  3.1.5 Choice of enforcement mechanisms 
 
The optimal blend of enforcement mechanisms is dependant on the country’s characteristics and 
will vary by type of activities. The optimal blend of mechanisms will therefore be subject to the 
institutional development of the country, especially its contracting environment.166
 
   
In some country’s social norms will be the first point of call whilst other formal enforcement 
mechanisms will follow suit. It has been submitted that social pressures are probably the most 
important corporate governance mechanism. Moreover, the media can fulfil a critically important 
role to enforce corporate governance despite its not utilising any legal tools.167
 
  
The following factors have an influence on the choice of the enforcement mechanism used: 
 
 The overall environment that prevails in a country. In the instance where the institutional 
environment is weak public enforcement plays a limited role. Similarly, where courts are 
weak and ineffective other enforcement mechanisms are usually favoured168
 The costs and benefits of the enforcement mechanism. In countries where litigation cost 
are exorbitant, private enforcement will struggle
;  
169
 ‘Path dependence’ – This means that  an enforcement mechanism may be introduced and 
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 The corporate governance problem(s) evident in a particular country. In the UK an the 
US, the main corporate governance challenge relates to holding managers accountable to 
shareholders, whilst emerging markets grapple with ‘balancing incentives for controlling 
shareholders and protecting minority rights against actions by inside shareholders’171
The usage of an enforcement mechanism will also depend on the interaction between other 
enforcement mechanisms to ensure that a decision is reached. For example, legal backing is 
required for shareholder lobbying groups.
   
172
 
   
3.1.6 Balanced enforcement  
 
As indicated above, jurisdictions that better enforce legal rights in respect of protection of 




Even though this theory is plausible, it seems to be weighted on the side if investor protection at 
the expense of providing managers with sufficient incentives and discretion to ensure the success 
of the company. This theory also limits the role of institutional and large shareholders in closely 
held companies, particularly in respect of monitoring management.174
 
      
For the purpose of this research paper it is important to emphasise that enforcement strategies 
should be cognisant of the balance needed in corporate governance. 
  
3.1.7 Enforcement and Legitimacy 
 
The essence of enforcement lies in its legitimacy. It is explained that legal rules and codes of 
good corporate governance that lack legitimacy are not likely to be effectively enforced.175
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To ensure legitimacy there is a general caution against transplanting enforcement mechanisms 
from one country to another without proper consultation. As a result, enforcement from the top-
down is strongly discouraged.176
 
 
3.1.8 Enforcement and Politics 
 
The effectiveness of many enforcement mechanisms is directly linked to the degree of 
importance it has been allocated by the political fraternity. Therefore, in instances where the 
political will is strong in respect of enforcing existing laws and regulation, enforcement in 
general will enjoy resounding efficacy. The experience of Poland, for example, is evidence that a 
strong political will is critical. Despite having a strong regulatory framework and sufficient 
competence in the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Warsaw Stock Exchange, 
Poland has weak regulatory bodies due to poor political will. As a result these bodies are unable 
to focus on corporate governance or its enforcement.177
 
       
Despite this easy solution to what appears to be a complex challenge for developing nations, this 
political will seems insignificant and in some instances absent. Many reasons can be attributed to 
the lack of political will. Firstly, investment in enforcement of corporate governance needs to 
compete with the other uses of government funds, which at times are more pressing than 
improved levels of enforcement. Also investing in public enforcement mechanisms often 
requires capacity-building which is a long term effort with minimal political reward. As such, 
securing sufficient funding for these types of initiatives proves challenging. Thirdly, improving 
public enforcement involves changes to a number of bodies that generally operates in sequence 
or alternatively in a hierarchy. For example, action is initiated by the police then referred to 
courts, and then back to the police. Revamping these bodies could be both a costly and complex 
matter. Fourthly, the gains achieved via the improvement of these bodies are not distributed 
evenly among citizens and hence not seen as a priority. Moreover, when government is closely 
linked to business, they would generally not be susceptible to corporate reform.178
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3.1.9 Enforcement and Corruption 
 
Corruption is one of the major challenges facing the effectiveness of the enforcement system. 
This particularly affects the state of affairs in developing countries. It has been noted that 
regulators in developing countries often use their political power to extract bribes from 
stakeholders. Furthermore, there is also evidence that governments in the developing world also 
use regulation to punish their political opponents. It goes without saying that this has an adverse 
impact on enforcement, and in particular public enforcement mechanisms. These occurrences are 
not conducive to building strong financial markets. Similarly, private enforcement does not 
escape the impact of corruption. Often private litigation via the judiciary also bears the brunt of 
corruption.179
 
     
To combat such corrupt governments, Jackson and Roe (2008) suggest that nations should focus 
on improving their public administration. They explain that improving public administration 
involves either improving regulatory bodies in respect of public enforcement or the courts in 
respect of private enforcement. They further suggest that efforts of improvement should initially 
be focused on regulators. It is reasoned that the specialised assistance through regulators will be 
easier to transform than broad based assistance programs offered by the judiciary.180
 
   
3.2. Private enforcement versus public enforcement 
 
Private enforcement versus public enforcement is emerging as an important concern in an 
ongoing debate about the extent to which law explains differences in financial markets around 
the world.181 There are some commentators, of whom Rafael La Porta is noteworthy, that favour 
private enforcement over public enforcement whilst others support a ‘blend’ of enforcement 
mechanisms comprising both private enforcement and public enforcement as a means to 
strengthen financial markets and propel economic growth.182
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This debate has spilled over onto the agenda’s of development agencies. To this end, the World 
Bank has proclaimed that private enforcement should be favoured as opposed to public 
enforcement. Accordingly, the World Bank has encouraged countries to think about ways to 
enhance their private enforcement mechanisms.183 Similar views are also held by researchers 
currently in the employ of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central 
Bank. Also many European countries supported the view that stronger private enforcement was 
needed to expand domestic capital markets and improve corporate governance. To give effect to 
this view they proceeded to change procedural rules that inhibited private suits.184
 
  
Despite this proclamation by the World Bank and others, assessing the relative importance of 
private enforcement over public enforcement is still immensely important. Such a study has 
major implications both for the academic understanding of what strengthens corporate 
governance and for the content of current development programmes.185
 
  
To ascertain whether private enforcement should be favoured over public enforcement, the 
research paper will rely on empirical work undertaken in the area of securities regulation. This 
methodology is possible since many elements of securities regulation involve issues related to 




Why consider enforcement strategies? To highlight the need for enforcement strategies two 
hypotheses can be advanced.  
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The first hypothesis – the null hypothesis – advocates that law does not matter.  It is premised on 
the view that sufficient market and legal mechanisms - found in contract and delict law - exist for 
the securities markets to prosper. 187
 
  
The second hypothesis – the enforcement hypothesis – is premised on the view that reputations, 
contract and delict law are inadequate to ensure that managers do not cheat investors. It is 
submitted that the benefits of cheating are significantly attractive whilst litigation is too costly 
and unpredictable to serve as an effective deterrent. On this basis, it is argued that there is a need 
for effective enforcement strategies.188
 
 
Importantly, these two hypotheses differ primarily in their scope of the enforcement framework. 
It goes without saying that there is need for enforcement in general and enforcement strategies 
specifically. In a study conducted by La Porta et al (2003) it was found that there is a correlation 




In respect of the debate on whether to favour private enforcement over public enforcement to 
strengthen financial markets and propel economic growth, two theories have to date been 
developed; namely:  
 
 Private enforcement primacy ; and  
 Multi-enforcement primacy.190
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3.2.1. ‘Private enforcement Primacy’  
 
‘Public enforcement appears to play a small role in the development of stock markets. Private enforcement systems 
foster greater investor confidence and ultimately more robust securities markets.’191
 
  
As can be deduced from the quotation above, proponents of the private enforcement primacy 
view advocates that private parties have better incentives to bring appropriate actions as opposed 
to public actors and are thus better enforcers. They further submit that there is an insignificant 
relationship between public enforcement and financial development and hence public 
enforcement is unlikely to facilitate financial market development.192
 
 
3.2.2 ‘Multiple mechanisms’  
 
This theory considers private enforcement as one of the categories required to create an effective 
enforcement system that can deter manager misconduct and provide the foundation for strong 
securities markets. In this regard, private enforcement is potentially useful but not critical.193
 
  
3.3 Review of relevant literature 
3.3.1 Overview of relevant literature 
 
In various articles, La Porta et al show that there is a link between the protection of shareholders 
and the development of financial markets. They submit that countries with stronger shareholder 
protection will generally have stronger financial markets.194
 
 For the purpose of this research 
paper, I agree with this theory and use it as a point of departure for examining whether private 
enforcement should be favoured as opposed to public enforcement.  
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In a later article by La Porta et al (2003) they further developed the theory by proclaiming that 
private enforcement mechanisms promotes greater investor confidence and stronger financial 
markets. This proclamation was based on the premise that financial development is encouraged 
by introducing extensive disclosure requirements and facilitating recovery of investor losses.195
 
  
Pursuant to this proclamation there has been many countries including development agencies that 
have given effect to this finding. As mentioned earlier, the World Bank encouraged countries to 
favour private enforcement over public enforcement.196
 
 
This theory is however not without criticisms. Firstly, the measurement of public enforcement 
adopted by La Porta et al is problematic. Jackson and Roe (2008) submit that indexing the 
regulators’ formal qualities falls short of ‘reliably indicating public enforcement’s bottom-line 
efficacy’.197 They further submit that the measurement relies too heavily on the regulators formal 
legal powers to investigate and sanction. In this regard, it is noted that many regulatory agencies 
fail to use these powers despite being entitled to do so. The research undertaken by Bhattacharya 
and Daouk into the efficacy of insider trading regulations is used in support of this criticism, 
since they showed that the key issue is not whether the agency had the powers but whether the 
agency actually utilised the powers.198
 
          
Following this study, Armour (2008) undertook an empirical assessment of the enforcement 
strategies used in the UK in an attempt to determine the significance of both private enforcement 
and public enforcement. In assessing the importance of these two categories of enforcement, he 
revealed that the public enforcement dominates the enforcement strategies in the UK. He further 
found that formal private enforcement, particularly shareholder litigation was insignificant in the 
realm of enforcement whilst informal private enforcement through the exercise of shareholder 
governance entitlements play a pivotal role in developing the financial market. This assessment 
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primarily addresses the central problem of corporate governance for UK listed firms, namely: 
rendering managers accountable to shareholders.199
 
 
Even though the assessment is addressing a particular corporate governance problem, it is 
significant in that it highlights that the UK, a country with a well developed financial market, is 
dominated by public enforcement strategies. Another important element of this study is that it 
reflects the importance of private enforcement albeit informal private enforcement.  
 
In March 2009, Jackson and Roe undertook to evaluate the value of public enforcement of 
securities law for the development of stock markets.  In so doing, they developed a new set of 
‘resources devoted to securities market oversight around the world’.200 This measurement 
involved measuring the resources of the staffing levels of securities regulators and their budgets. 
The use of such a measurement differentiates it from previous studies which focused on the 
formal powers of regulatory officials to measure the strength of public enforcement.201
 
   
Jackson and Roe (2008) submits a number of reasons for preferring these resource-based 
measurements. Firstly, securities regulators with higher budgets facilitate the conducting of 
market surveillance by public authorities. This is achieved by identifying infringements and 
determining the need for rules to remedy the infringement. Similarly higher budgets also 
encourages the perception that the public authority is more likely to detect and subsequently 
punish infringements. Secondly, public authorities that are well resourced are better positioned to 
conduct effective investigations to secure the success of the enforcement action. Thirdly, a 
sufficiently resourced public authority is in a position to draft, amend and better enforce 
regulatory rules. Lastly, there is evidence that public enforcement is also executed informally. It 
is submitted that these resource-based measurements of public enforcement are more strongly 
associated with robust financial markets. In other words, it is assumed that allocating more 
resources to public enforcement is strongly associated with robust capital markets. It is worth 
mentioning that these measurements are not without its caveats. It is recognised that that they are 
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limited in both concept and construction. For example, the allocation of adequate resources does 
not necessary infer that these resources will be used effectively.202
 
    
This study revealed that private enforcement is not prevalent over public enforcement. It does, 
however, demonstrate that public enforcement plays a role in market development. Furthermore, 
a direct comparison between private enforcement and public enforcement highlighted that public 
enforcement is generally on par with disclosure-based private enforcement in explaining 
financial outcomes around the world.203
 
 
In light of these findings, the paper questions the wisdom behind the proclamation of the World 
Bank, which favours private enforcement over public enforcement.204
 
   
According to Armour (2008) the findings of this study infer that enforcement by securities 
regulators can serve as a replacement where lawsuits are uncommon in the UK.205 He further 
argues that if this is assertion is accepted, and then it should follow that an investigation into the 
measures of regulatory output (the number of enforcement actions brought and the size of the 
penalties imposed relative to market size) should be significant. Armour notes further that this is 
not the case. To this end, he submits that ‘enforcement by securities regulators is thus an unlikely 
substitute for private enforcement in the UK corporate or securities law’.206
 
  
Notwithstanding the criticism highlighted above, this study has illustrated and argued that there 
is a role for both private enforcement and public enforcement.207
 
  
In a response to the ongoing debate about whether private enforcement should be favoured over 
public enforcement, Armour (2009) undertook a further study which involved a comparative 
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quantitative analysis of corporate law in the USA and the UK. This analysis was prompted by the 
view that stronger private enforcement was needed to expand domestic capital markets and 
improve corporate governance. In many instances, this view encouraged countries to entrench 
private enforcement by changing the procedural rules that inhibit private suits. The author found 
that private enforcement of corporate law through lawsuits against directors of publicly traded 
companies is more common in the USA than in the UK. This occurrence was primarily due to 
differences in civil procedure and substantive law. The comparative quantitative analysis also 
indicated that there was no support for the hypothesis that private enforcement of corporate law 
is central to strong markets and dispersed share ownership. The research also revealed that 
private enforcement of securities and insolvency law do not fill the gaps left by corporate law 
since proceedings are hardly ever brought against directors of UK companies. To remedy this 
situation the paper promotes the following substitutes: 
 
 Private enforcement of related areas of law (securities and bankruptcy law). This 
substitute can also constrain a director’s actions and could therefore possibly address 
managerial agency costs; 
 Public enforcement. In the UK context, the Takeover Panel may offer partial substitute 
for private enforcement; and 
 Shareholder governance rights – This concept refers to powers enjoyed by shareholders 
over key decisions in a company. It is recognised that governance rights has the 
potential to reduce managerial agency costs by giving shareholders the power to remove 
directors who fail to act in their best interest. Shareholder governance rights also gives 




Armour also makes the point that the lack of formal private enforcement highlights the 
importance of procedural rules, particularly general rules not limited to corporate cases. These 
procedural rules play a pivotal role in the practical operation of substantive rules. It is further 
noted that the differences that exist in ‘general rules governing class actions, contingency fees, 
and who pays the winner’s legal expenses, in tandem with rules specific to corporate law that 
                                                   











govern the availability of derivative actions and direct claims by shareholders’, could probably 
explain the large differences in levels of private enforcement.209
 
   
3.3.2 Comparative analysis of relevant literature (see Table 1)  
 
In view of the comparative analysis (as captured in Table I), the following deductions can be 
drawn: 
 
 The debate around whether to favour private enforcement as opposed to public 
enforcement stems from the notion that investor protection is related to strong financial 
markets, which is capable of propelling economic growth. 
 
 There is no unequivocal winner between private enforcement and public enforcement. 
More recent literature seems to prefer a ‘multiple mechanisms’ approach, which 
advocates that private enforcement is useful but not critical. This view is supported by 
resource based evidence focussing on the measurement of staffing levels of regulators 
and their budgets; empirical assessment of enforcement strategies in the UK and an 
empirical assessment comparison of the UK and the USA. In contrast, dated literature 
explicitly supports private enforcement as the main enforcement system to foster greater 
investor confidence and better developed stock markets. Proponents of this view support 
the ‘private enforcement primacy’ view. They base their argument on the view that 
private parties have better incentives to bring appropriate actions as opposed to public 
actors. On this basis private actors are better enforcers. 
 
 Both private enforcement and public enforcement has a role to play in protecting 
shareholders and thus in developing strong financial markets. 
 
 This leads us to the next obvious conclusion; there is no uniform measure of the 
effectiveness of the two different systems of enforcement. It is worth noting that the 
                                                   











articles by La Porta et al and, Jackson and Roe are very similar but differ in their 
measurements.  
 
 Furthermore, it is evident that most of the proposed measurements have their own set of 
shortcomings.       
 












Table I: Comparative analysis of the relevant empirical research 
  What works in Securities Laws? Enforcement Strategies in UK 
Corporate Governance: A Roadmap 
an Empirical Assessment 
Public and Private Enforcement 
of Securities Laws: Resource 
Based Evidence 
Private Enforcement of Corporate 
Law: An Empirical Comparison of 
the UK and US 
Theory 
categorisation 
Private enforcement primacy Multiple mechanisms  Multiple mechanisms Multiple mechanisms 
Objective To evaluate the impact of 
securities laws on the development 
of stock markets. 
To provide an overview of the 
‘empirical incidence’ of both 
private and public enforcement 
mechanisms to determine their 
importance.210
To evaluate the importance of 
public enforcement of 
securities law for the 
development of global stock 
markets. 211
To study private enforcement of 
corporate law in the UK and the 
US with the objective of 
ascertaining whether to favour the 
private enforcement primacy view 
or multiple mechanisms view. 
 
Scope A comparison of securities laws in 
49 countries, including South 
Africa. The selection of countries 
extends to both common and civil 
law countries.  
The study was confined to the 
United Kingdom (UK). 
55 countries, including South 
Africa. 





Methodology A comparative evaluation which 
included an –  
- analysis of the relevant 
provisions in securities law 
governing initial public offerings;  
- examination of the relationship 
between these provisions and the 
various measures of stock market 
development; and 
- interpretation of these 
correlations using available 
theories in securities law. 
An empirical assessment of the 
number of enforcement 
interventions used in relation to the 
range of enforcement mechanisms 
available in the UK.  
 
In limited instances, the data is 
supplemented with data on the size 




A comparative evaluation was 
used in this study. It involved 
collecting resource-based 




A comparative quantitative 
analysis to test the hypothesis 
about (i) the role and (ii) rate of 
private enforcement of corporate 
law in the US and UK.214
 
 
Time July 2003 
 
April 2008 March 2009 July 2009 
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Measurements     
Private 
Enforcement 
Disclosure requirements and 
liability rules. 
Three different actions that 





Attributes of public agency. Activities of the public agencies 
were considered. 
Resources of staffing levels of 
securities regulators and their 
budgets. 
 
Findings  Public enforcement plays a 
modest role in the development 
of stock markets. It is explained 
that a supervisor’s investigative 
powers and the strength of both 
criminal and non-criminal 
sanctions only applied in 
limited instances. 
 Stock market development is 
strongly associated with private 
enforcement via extensive 
disclosure requirements and a 
relatively low burden of proof 
on investors seeking to recover 
damages. This led the authors to 
conclude that a private 
enforcement system promotes 
greater investor confidence and 




 Shareholder litigation, which can 
be categorised under formal 
private enforcement, is 
insignificant in the realm of 
enforcement. 
 Enforcement efforts are 
dominated by public 
enforcement agencies. 
 Informal private enforcement 
through the exercise of 
shareholders governance 
entitlements plays a pivotal role 
in developing the securities 
market. These mechanisms are 
generally used to remove 
managers who have 
underperformed, induce high 
compliance rates with non-




 Public enforcement enjoys 
a direct relationship with 
financial outcomes, which 
include: stock market 
capitalisation, trading 
volumes and the number 
of domestic firms.  
 A direct comparison 
between private 
enforcement and public 
enforcement highlighted 
that public enforcement is 
generally on par with 
disclosure-based private 
enforcement in explaining 
the financial outcomes 
around the world. 
 The data does not indicate 
that private enforcement is 
prevalent over public 
enforcement – it does 
however indicate that 
public enforcement also 
has a critical role to play 




 Private enforcement of 
corporate law through lawsuits 
against directors of publicly 
traded companies is more 
common in the US than in the 
UK. This was primarily due to 
differences in civil procedure 
and substantive law.  
 There was no support for the 
hypothesis that private 
enforcement of corporate law 
is central to strong markets 
and dispersed share ownership. 
 Private enforcement of 
securities and insolvency law 
do not fill the gaps left by 
corporate law. 218
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3.4. Summary of part C 
 
 
This section commenced with an overview of enforcement, indicating that enforcement is crucial 
for development, in particular for the creation of strong financial markets. It goes on to describe 
enforcement as relating to both rules and conduct.  It is explained that restricting the concept to a 
‘rule-based account’ automatically infers a contravention of a rule or code which forms the basis 
of the enforcement activity. This, however, fails to take into account the actions and inactions 
that attract an enforcement intervention. 
 
Pursuant to this understanding of enforcement, a two-by-two classification of enforcement 
mechanism is used. This classification is a means to organise the debate that follows and capture 
the significance of the initiating parties. Importantly, the categorisation also highlights that both 
private and public enforcement have advantages and limitations. From this one can infer that the 
debate in respect of private enforcement versus public enforcement is a complex matter. The 
categorisation also highlights the mechanics of theses various mechanisms, explaining factors 
that either promote or inhibit the usage of these mechanisms. It is worth emphasising that these 
categories of enforcement should not be seen as substitutes for each other but rather as 
complementing each other. More clarity is provided in item 3.1.5 in this regard, where specific 
factors are highlighted that influences the choice of enforcement mechanisms. This discussion 
reiterates the view that favouring one category of enforcement mechanism over another is a 
complex exercise that requires due consideration to the institutional structures of a country. One 
could probably argue that private enforcement mechanisms may be better suited to weak 
institutional environments since their reliance on these institutions is less intense than public 
enforcement. In my view, this argument is limited particularly in respect of establishing good 
corporate governance.         
 
Furthermore, the paper also makes reference to certain elements that are crucial to the 
development of effective enforcement. These include: developing an enforcement system that 
creates a corporate governance equilibrium (ideal balance between shareholder protection and 











in of the political fraternity. On the other side, corruption is identified as the main threat to the 
viability of the enforcement system.  
 
Turning to the unfolding debate about whether private enforcement should be favoured over 
public enforcement to establish good corporate governance, the following conclusions can be 
drawn: 
 
 Reforming enforcement is a complex process but crucial for development. For 
enforcement to be successful there needs to be a degree of legitimacy. 
 
 There is no obvious winner between private enforcement and public enforcement.  
 
 In declaring whether private enforcement should be favoured over public enforcement 
or vice versa there needs to be some sort of due consideration to the corporate 
governance challenges facing a particular country.219
 
 
 It is important to create a degree of balance – a corporate governance equilibrium – 
between ‘investor protection and the desire to provide managers and controlling owners 
with sufficient incentives and discretion.’220
 
   
 The debate has not spilled over into South Africa or even Africa. Empirical research on 








                                                   
219 Erik Berglof and Stijn Claessens Enforcement and Corporate Governance (2003).  
















The research paper recognises that good corporate governance, amongst others, can assure 
providers of corporate finance that their investments will be protected. In response to this 
recognition, the paper sets out to develop an understanding of good corporate governance in 
South Africa and to ascertain whether South Africa has the enforcement framework to assure 
providers of corporate finance that their investments will be protected. In so doing, it was 
established that good corporate governance varies from country to country. However, there are 
elements that can be regarded as common to establish good corporate governance. It was also 
noted that South Africa has recently undertaken a complete overhaul of its company law. The 
objective of this reform process was to modernise and align company law with international and 
legislative trends. As such the new company law set-up is both modern and comprehensive, 
particularly in respect of its enforcement framework. This was highlighted with a discussion on 
the developments of the enforcement framework relating to corporate governance and a 
comparison with the UK enforcement framework. This discussion led us to conclude that South 
Africa has the enforcement framework to assure providers of capital finance that their assets will 
be protected. This led into the next phase of the research paper, which submits that enforcement 
can guarantee good corporate governance. 
 
In this section of the paper, it was established that enforcement has an impact on the overall 
effectiveness of the corporate governance system. In other words, it is enforcement that ensures 
that corporate governance operates effectively. It follows, that efforts should be concentrated on 
developing sound strategies of enforcement to guarantee good corporate governance. 
 
In response to this, the paper established a common understanding of an effective enforcement 
system and then proceeded to critically evaluate whether private enforcement should be favoured 












Having regard to relevant literature, it is evident that the debate has been subjected to limited 
empirical analysis. This analysis was mainly in the field of economics and finance, with law only 
recently joining the discussion. The debate is an ongoing one with important considerations 
relating to the development of strong markets capable to propel the economic growth of a 
country. It therefore goes without saying that the debate is both relevant and important in the 
South African context, more so after the recent global financial crises. 
 
In evaluating the viability of an enforcement strategy in relation to corporate governance, the 
researcher submits that a three-pronged analysis should be adopted, which include the following 
stages: 
 
(i) The first stage involves an investigation into whether a country is capable of good 
corporate governance. Apart from the elements highlighted in part B of this research 
paper, such an investigation should also consider whether a country has good laws, 
principles and codes relating to corporate governance.  
 
(ii) The second stage involves an evaluation of the enforcement framework. As indicated 
in part C of this research paper, elements indicating efficiency includes: legitimacy, 
political support, institutional environment and corporate governance equilibrium. 
 
(iii) A correlation between the enforcement framework and the prevailing corporate 
governance problem(s). This includes, identifying the corporate governance 
problem(s).       
 
If one applies this proposed analysis to the South African context, it can be inferred that South 
Africa meets the first two stages. South Africa has the necessary laws, rules and procedures 
capable of establishing good corporate governance.  
 
Furthermore, the enforcement framework seems adequate and relatively satisfactory when 
compared to the UK, a developed nation with a strong financial market. In light of the recent 











necessary to drive enforcement. As for legitimacy, there has been extensive consultation during 
the drafting of the new Companies Act and some of the new bodies were merely reformed to 
address challenges. The institutional context may be challenging to understand, particularly in 
the absence of relevant empirical research. South Africa has a fairly balanced institutional 
context, favouring both private and public enforcement. On this basis, it can be concluded that 
South Africa has an effective enforcement system. 
 
The third stage involves determining whether the enforcement framework correlates with the 
corporate governance challenges. In the absence of empirical evidence in this regard, one can 
argue that South Africa faces many corporate governance problems, which varies from holding 
managers accountable to ‘balancing incentives for controlling shareholders and protecting 
minority rights against actions by insider shareholders’.221
 
 This view is based on the fact that 
South Africa is one of the leading developing countries in the world, continually developing its 
financial markets. As such, it is burdened with varied corporate governance problems, which 
includes the typical corporate governance challenges facing both developed and developing 
countries.    
On this basis, the research paper would favour a multiple mechanisms approach to enforcement. 
An approach capable of addressing most corporate governance challenges. 
 
Furthermore, it also makes intuitive sense for developing countries to strive to develop an 
enforcement system containing both private enforcement and public enforcement to entrench 
good corporate governance. Good corporate governance is too important to risk favouring one 
mechanism over another.    
 
Notwithstanding this analysis, there is need in South Africa for empirical analysis on 
enforcement. It is important to keep in mind that this research paper restricted itself to 
enforcement of one aspect of corporate governance; namely: assuring providers of corporate 
finance that their investments will be protected. Going forward an investigation into other 
aspects of corporate governance would be useful.  
                                                   












Hopefully, this research paper will serve as a basis to encourage similar studies in developing 
countries at large, but specifically in respect of South Africa. The reform process in South Africa 
has opened up new prospects and will give rise to new challenges for corporate governance. 
Academics, researchers and practitioners would do well to take heed of the discussions, findings 
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